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Abstract: 
This paper calculates a unit labor-cost based real effective exchange rate for China for 
the period 1987-2002. It examines carefully which data sources can be used given the 
known limitations of Chinese data and constructs to them together with 
internationally available unit labor cost estimations for a number of industrialized 
countries, including Korea and Taiwan. It is found that gauged by the ULC measure 
the increase in manufacturing competitiveness from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s 
has been even more remarkably than given known industrial-price-based measures for 
real effective exchange rates suggest. However, since then, Chinese manufacturers 
have lost more ground than previously thought. 
Keywords:  China, international competitiveness, real exchange rate 
JEL-Classification: F14, F16 Introduction 
Today, it is widely accepted in the policy realm that labor in China is so cheap that the 
country will have a competitive edge in manufacturing for at least a decade to come. 
However, it is often neglected, that labor costs are only one determinant for national 
competitiveness. Almost equally important are the productivity developments in the 
country concerned as well as the nominal exchange rate.  
While productivity growth in manufacturing in China has been undisputedly high 
(even though the exact magnitude has been deputed), wages in the sector have also 
picked up over recent years. Moreover, there has been much debate lately whether 
China should let its currency appreciate, which would further dampen international 
competitiveness. In order to better gauge how the international competitiveness has 
changed over the last decade, one would need to compare the overall cost 
development through bost domestic price increases relative to foreign price increases 
and changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
For such an exercise, a real effective exchange rate (REER) would be the best choice. 
Such an index would show the change in the real exchange rate relative to the most 
important trade partners. Up to now, the only widely available REER index for China 
is from JP Morgan. However, the investment bank's index is based on industrial 
good's final prices. Especially in an economy in which market power and therefore 
mark-ups over production costs shift rapidly, this might not be the best gauge for 
international competitiveness. A real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs 
would be a more appropriate tool. 
This paper tries to construct such an unit-labor-cost-based REER and compares the 
results with the industrial-prices-based REER. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 explains which data has been used to construct the index. Section 3 
presents the results and interprets them. Section 4 touches shortly on the issue of 
possibly overstatement of Chinese GDP growth and its consequences on the ULC-
REER index and section 5 concludes. 
Data 
A Real effective exchange rate (REER) is defined as a country's weighted bilateral 





REER ∑ = α  
with  i α denoting the weight of country i, P denoting the domestic price level, ei 
denoting the bilateral nominal exchange rate with country i and Pi denoting the price 
level in that country. As we try to construct a unit-labor-cost-based REER, P and Pi 
stand for the respective unit labor costs. Thus we need three kind of data: Unit labor 
costs for China and its most important trading partners, nominal bilateral exchange 
rates and the trade weights.  
As it is standard in international unit labor cost comparison, we only need the relative 
change in unit labor costs in a common currency, not an absolute value for the labor 
costs of one unit of production. The resulting REER thus can – as is again standard – 
be only interpreted as a relative gauge of competitiveness changes over time, not as an 
absolute measure of competitiveness. 
Fortunately, unit labor costs indices in US dollars are readily available from the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Also easily available from the IMF is the bilateral US 
dollar-Renminbi exchange rate. 
What poses more of a problem are unit labor costs for China. To compute them, both 
data for the wage sum paid and the real value added in manufacturing would be used 
as unit labor costs are defined as wage costs per unit of output. Again, real value 
added is provided by the Chinese government and can be easily obtained from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators. Getting a decent proxy for the wage 
sum in manufacturing is more tricky. I opted for the wage (per worker) data from the 
ILO's Laborsta database and the corresponding number on employment in 
manufacturing. The ILO gets this data from official Chinese sources, but the Chinese 
employment data seems to reasonably accurate (Young 2003) and the development of 
the wage sum follows a similar trend as total private consumption, an indication, that 
the numbers might also be of acceptable quality. The wage data from the ILO 
includes not only contracted wages, but also bonuses paid, a part of wages which is of 
increasing significance in the Chinese economy. With Value Added VA, the wage rate W and employment N in manufacturing as well as the nominal exchange rate e 
known, it is easy to compute a unit labor cost index in US dollars: 
VA
WN
e ULC =  
Table 1 presents the thus derived index of unit labor costs in dollar terms along with 
the BLS indices for Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the USA and Germany. 
A second caveat might be the computation of weights  i α . There has been much 
debate how to most appropriately compute the trading partners weights. Recently, 
there has been a shift towards including the effects of a change in the competitors' unit 
labor costs on third (export) markets. JP Morgan, but also the US Fed now take into 
account the weight competitors have in the main export markets (Hargreaves and 
Strong 2003). However, as this approach neglects the impacts of competitor's 
competitiveness on domestic firms producing for the domestic market, it is not 
necessarily a complete proxy (Ellis 2003). Especially in the case of China, where a lot 
of outsourcing from industrial and other emerging economies has taken place, the 
companies working on processing trade face fierce competition from the upstream 
producers for further out- or even insourcing.
1 Moreover, since the inclusion of third 
market effects requires a lot of computations, it makes the final index less transparent. 
I therefore opted for a simple straightforward weighting by export and import shares 












with Xi denoting Chinese exports to country i, Mi Chinese imports from country i. As 
the availability of competitors' unit labor cost is limited, only those countries for 
which they are easily available (see above) are included.  
Another aspect which complicates the picture is the question whether to change the 
weights over time or keep them constant. Simply using different weights each periods 
would lead to a biased time series: Suppose that a China trades with two countries A 
                                                 
1 Lately, there even have been reports that Japanese companies are again insourcing production from 
China. and B, A having a dollar unit labor cost index above China's, B having a dollar unit 
labor cost index below China's. If now country's B share in trade with China 
increases, the overall REER index would show a loss in competitiveness even if both 
bilateral exchange rates remained constant (Ellis 2001). Conseqeuntly, JP Morgan 
uses fixed weights for computing its REER. However, keeping the weights constant 
might be misleading in circumstances in which trade patterns change significantly, 
which has been the case for China. 
Consequently, I have calculated two alternative REER series: One based on fixed 
2000 trade weights and one in which the series with rolling trade weights has been 
spliced each period, following Ellis (2001): 

































The rationale behind this formula is straightforward: The REER index is changed by 
the amount it would have changed had the trade weights remained constant from the 
preceding period. Thus it only catches price, not quantity effects. 
Results 
Table 3 and Figure 1 present the resulting two unit-labor-cost-based REER indices 
compared to JP Morgan's industrial-prices-based REER. As can be seen, the constant 
weight and rolling weight computed unit-labor-cost-based REERs track each other 
rather closely. However, the magnitude of change differs significantly between the 
industrial-prices-based and the unit labor cost-based indices. The new ULC-REER 
index shows a much stronger increase in competitiveness in the early 1990s. Second, 
China's relative competitive position does not appear to be as adversely influenced by 
the Asian crisis in 1998 as it is suggested by the JP Morgan index. Together with the 
fall in Chinese manufacturing employment during this time, this suggests that firms 
have reacted to the fall in demand with a productivity-increasing labor shedding.  
Finally, based on unit labor costs, China has been loosing relative competitiveness to 
a much larger degree since the late 1990s. According to this measure, China has 
appreciated by almost 25 percent since the de facto-pegging of the Renminbi in the 
Mid-1990s, while JP Morgan's index shows only an appreciation of less than 20 percent and a slight improvement in competitiveness lately. However, as JP Morgan is 
using industrial prices, this might just be the consequence of increased competition 
and falling margins. The underlying competitive position of the Chinese companies 
seems rather to be eroding following the ULC-REER index.  
Three distinct reasons can be made out for this: First, Chinese unit labor costs have 
picked up since the late 1990s. Second, unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector in 
other countries have been declining, notably in the United States and in Korea and 
Taiwan. While the latter experienced a large drop in unit labor costs as a consequence 
of the nominal devaluation during the Asian crisis, the US experienced downward 
pressure on unit labor costs when the 2001 recession kept wages down while 
productivity continued to increase strongly. Thirdly, Taiwan where unit labor costs 
continued to fall after the Asian crisis, has a growing importance in China's trade; 
since Taiwanese producers are delivering a lot of intermediary products to the 
Chinese mainland, its share in the bilateral trade has continuously increased. 
Statistical Uncertainties 
Whenever a statistic is concerned with the Chinese economy, the first question is how 
reliable the input data is and what kind of bias they might exhibit. For this paper's 
calculations, the value added for manufacturing is the prime candidate of misreported 
statistics. It has been repeatedly argued that Chinese GDP figures – and consequently 
value added figures – overestimate the actual growth, both for measuring mistakes in 
the relevant price indices as well as for intentional tampering with the statistical raw 
data on local levels of government (e.g. Keidel 2001; Rouen 1997). 
If however, value added in manufacturing were over-reported while wages and 
employment are reasonably correctly reported, the result would be an understatement 
of the actual real appreciation. If this misreporting applied to the whole time frame, 
the curve would tilt upward, resulting in a larger loss of competitiveness since the 
mid-1990s than already reported. The understatement of the real appreciation and loss 
in competitiveness would be more pronounced in times of economic slow-down, 
which seem to be particularly vulnerable for over-reporting of real GDP. This could 
particularly be the case for the period of 1998/99 in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. 
However, these caveats would not question the basic result from the ULC-REER, 
namely that China's manufacturing has lost competitiveness to a non-neglectable degree since 1995. Moreover, the fact, that the ULC-REER tracks JP Morgan's price 
based REER index over a large part of the time period rather closely might be a hint 
that overstatement over the period as a whole is not as severe as sometimes assumed. 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that using a unit-labor-cost-based real effective exchange rate, 
the swings in Chinese international competitiveness over the two recent decades has 
been even larger than suggested by the so far mainly-used industrial-prices-based real 
effective exchange rate. During the early reform years, the Chinese manufacturing 
sector improved its competitiveness by enormous margins. Since 1995, however, 
competitiveness has been deteriorating again with a constant real appreciation of the 
Renminbi in unit labor terms. 
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Table 1: Unit Labor Costs Manufacturing, US-Dollar Basis, 1992=100 
 Germany Japan  Korea  Taiwan  USA  China 
1987  74.9 85.1 60.6 66.3 86.9 115.6
1988  76.9 93.3 77.8 75.5 86.7 127.6
1989  73.0 87.2 91.6 85.2 90.5 120.3
1990  87.3 83.9 93.0 89.7 93.7 98.7
1991  87.5 91.8 100.3 91.1 97.6 98.4
1992  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1993  98.7 115.3 102.6 98.1 100.6 104.6
1994  98.2 125.8 106.8 99.0 98.5 78.0
1995  114.2 131.6 124.3 99.2 94.8 84.8
1996  111.6 109.5 125.9 95.4 93.5 82.4
1997  94.0 97.4 100.2 89.5 91.9 77.0
1998  92.9 92.2 65.8 77.4 92.8 72.3
1999  91.5 101.0 68.8 78.3 91.3 72.2
2000  79.7 98.4 70.4 78.1 92.3 74.6
2001  79.5 88.0 66.5 69.4 94.1 76.5
2002  83.9 89.1 72.4 63.8 90.2 79.3
 
Source: For Germany, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and USA: BLS; 
China: Own Calculation based on World Bank, ILO data 
 
Table 2: Trade Weights used for computing the index by country and year, in % 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
BEL  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
CAN  4.5 4.6 2.9 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.1
DEU  11.2 10.7 10.0 9.4 9.2 8.6 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.2 6.5 7.1 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.4
DNK  0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
FRA  3.5 3.3 3.8 4.5 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.2
GBR  3.8 3.5 3.5 4.0 2.8 2.7 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.1
ITA  4.7 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
JPN  44.7 43.2 39.9 36.0 35.4 35.0 33.4 33.3 33.6 33.4 31.2 28.8 28.6 28.5 28.2 27.2
KOR  0.0 0.6 2.0 4.4 6.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 9.7 10.9 12.0 10.1 10.5 11.7 11.4 11.6
NLD  2.7 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.9
NOR  0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
SWE  1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7
TWN  1.2 2.4 3.5 4.8 6.5 7.9 11.6 10.5 9.7 9.9 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.2 10.1 11.6
USA  21.2 22.0 24.9 24.6 24.2 24.4 24.6 25.6 24.5 24.2 25.9 28.3 27.4 26.0 26.2 26.5
  
Table 3: Unit-Labor-Cost Based REER for China, 1995=100 
 






1987  182.3 184.1 
1988  189.6 192.0 
1989  183.9 185.9 
1990  143.5 144.6 125.9
1991  135.5 136.3 114.6
1992  130.1 130.9 113.8
1993  131.7 132.6 132.2
1994  95.9 96.4 95.4
1995  100.0 100.0 100.0
1996  104.1 103.9 106.2
1997  107.9 107.5 113.5
1998  109.0 108.1 119.7
1999  106.4 105.8 113.4
2000  113.5 113.3 116.0
2001  122.3 122.1 121.9
2002  125.8 126.0 119.0
2003     113.4
 
 
















































Figure 1: Different Measures for Chinese REER, 1995=100 